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This document outlines the Air Line Pilots Association’s (ALPA) aviation
automation concerns and expresses the recommendations of both experienced
pilots and experts alike. Refer to our statement of position document for
additional details at www.ALPA.org under Safety, HFT (Human Factors and
Training). Safe and effective aviation automation∗ is only possible when human
factors principles are utilized properly. We strongly encourage engineers,
regulators, and operators to apply human factors considerations at every stage of
aviation automation hardware, software, and procedure design. Occasionally
procedures or products are implemented without these considerations. This
inattention can make usage problematic and has produced unintended
consequences resulting in accidents and incidents. Incorporation of human factors
considerations early in product/procedure design will help to avoid repetition of
past mistakes and will ensure that automation maintains and increases the level of
aviation safety in the future.
Automation is and will continue to play an important role in the evolution of global air
transportation. Due to the complexity that arises from decreased traffic separation and increased
use of automation, the dangers of coupling - tight integration and interdependence - increase as
well. When an automated coupled system fails, the failure can escalate and cause catastrophic
breakdown of the entire system. Appropriate human involvement can provide flexibility to
counter problems with overly integrated automation.
In order to design against these failures it is essential to follow clear human factors
guidelines that allow pilots and air traffic controllers/managers to interact with each other. It is
important to design the automation in a way that complements the strengths of the human and
automation and protects against their limitations. To paraphrase the director of the NASA
∗

We define automation functionally for commercial flight in terms of how it is used for flight purposes. The three
purposes include the following: Control Automation, Information Automation, and Management Automation.
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Aviation Program, Amy Pritchett (May 2008, Human Factors in NextGen, Arlington, TX),
automation cannot handle the complexities of the Next Generation Air Transportation System
without humans at the center as integral components and still maintain our current level of
safety.
Automation is evolving into new roles to enable new aviation systems to function with
increased utilization and control. This places new demands on a system already under pressure.
The new automation components are themselves a potential source of error and risk. This is
especially true if automation design and implementation has not adhered to established human
factors principles.
Aircraft will still need to be flown by pilots. Piloting tasks will change and evolve,
including mastering new types of automation and responsibilities. The ultimate responsibility for
flying a safe aircraft will remain with pilots.
Automation Philosophy
A well-trained and well-qualified pilot has been, is, and will be the critical center point of
aircraft safety systems and an integral safety component of the entire commercial aviation
system (ALPA Unmanned Aircraft System (UAS) Policy, May 2007). This system includes not
only the crew and aircraft hardware/software but also the operator, regulator and all policies and
procedures employed.
The pilot in command has the final authority and responsibility to assure the safe
outcome of the flight. It is imperative that the pilot is able to completely control the aircraft
during all phases of flight. A design is unacceptable if the aircraft or the transportation system
within which it is intended to operate would prevent the pilot from exercising complete control at
all times.
The pilot must continue to be the decision maker at the center of the aircraft operation.
This provides needed flexibility in a tightly coupled automated system. This also ensures vested
human involvement and responsibility. A pilot is certified by regulating authorities with strict
mandates for command and operation of the aircraft. These standards help maintain the high
levels of safety required in commercial aviation.
Design and implementation of automated systems must focus on augmenting the benefits
and strengths of humans while protecting against natural limitations. In general, automation
should solve problems, not create additional problems in new or existing systems.
Design
The most effective automation design places appropriate emphasis on human capabilities
and limitations. This type of design focuses on several foundational human factors issues. These
include appropriate feedback, meaningful alerts and warnings, proper level of automation, and
optimum level of pilot involvement per task. Human factors design requirements and end
product goals must be established prior to design conceptualization with input from pilots and
other users. This allows necessary modifications prior to actual development.
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Automation systems should also be designed for the environment in which they will be
operating. This includes the ability to handle short-notice changes necessary to accommodate
factors such as varying weather conditions, changes in routing due to the presence of other
aircraft, and degraded automation performance or failure. This must be done without placing
unmanageable demands on the pilots and air traffic system. Automation systems should also be
designed so they are compatible with the original equipment manufacturer (OEM) Flight Deck
design philosophy in which they will be used, including those systems added to the flight deck
after initial certification.
Pilots must be able to control every level of automation. For this to work correctly, the
automation should provide the pilots with clear indication of both its present status and expected
future state. The automation must provide adequate time for the pilots to intervene in the
operation if necessary. Alerts and warnings must balance too many false alarms with too few
critical warnings. Too many false alarms can result in lack of trust; too few actual alarms can
result in missing critical failures and false security.
Standardized procedures and Crew Resource Management (CRM) should be considered
in conjunction with automation design. The intended procedures must be communicated to the
users. Consideration must also be given to the sequence, synchronization of procedures and time
criticality of any task. A procedure may be benign when performed in normal sequence, but
hazardous if performed slightly out of sequence.
Evaluation and Certification
Every new automation component or tool will require an operational evaluation and
should be conducted with the participation of the end user, i.e. line pilots. The operational
evaluation should include the accomplishment of a thorough risk analysis that leads to a risk
mitigation plan. This must be accomplished before any automation system is introduced into the
aviation domain.
Scenarios should be built to evaluate the automation function in the operational context in
which it will be utilized. Evaluations should be objective with reproducible metrics. These
evaluations must be accomplished prior to certification and accepted for use.
Clear evidence must show that pilots and controllers are able to use the automated system
or procedure at acceptable error rates – prior to implementation. This evidence should include
empirical tests with sufficient statistical power and external validity to guarantee reliable results.
The evidence must demonstrate that typical operators are able to use the equipment to perform
both normal and emergency operations. Testing should also show that any actual operational
errors or the precursors to those errors are both low risk and only occur at low rates that do not
pose risk for actual operations.
Training
The objective of training should be to provide pilots with a complete and accurate model
of the automation system. This enables pilots to correctly identify and predict the system’s
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actions and to control them during normal and abnormal situations. Training should not be used
as an attempted substitute for poor Human Factors design.
Airline specific automation philosophy should be standardized across fleets to the
maximum extent possible as long as it does not conflict with the OEM flight deck design
philosophy. This reduces transition errors, increases consistency across fleets, improves
transitioning pilot performance, and allows for standardized assessment of potential safety
issues.
Any flight automation maneuver or procedure introduced in initial, recurrent, or special
training that requires motor skills or complex sequenced actions must be trained in full motion
simulator with enough repetition to promote retention and provide the opportunity to
demonstrate proficiency.
Specific benefits can be achieved with the consideration and application of human factors
to automation in aviation. Current operations will become safer by trapping and eliminating
system design flaws. Future operations will be able to meet demands such as increased capacity
and efficiency while increasing the existing level of safety.
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